While the world’s media has largely focused on Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict, unrest in Oromia (Central Ethiopia) and other regions reveals the scale of volatility within the country. Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest region, has been the scene of ethnic tensions, driven by longstanding grievances over political sidelining, unequal resource allocation and land rights. The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), an armed opposition group, has intensified clashes with government forces, contributing to widespread civil unrest and instability that threatens to disrupt Ethiopia’s fragile federation.
These conflicts are not isolated. In the aftermath of the Tigray War, Ethiopia is once again engulfed in violent internal fighting, now involving militia groups from Amhara and Oromia. Conflict in these regions began to emerge during the escalation of the Tigray War in 2021. At the time, Amhara groups largely allied with the central government, while the Oromo sided with the Tigrayans. However, following the war, the Ethiopian government’s crackdown on regional security forces ignited resistance from both former allies and adversaries. By late 2023, military operations in Amhara escalated, and peace talks with the largest Oromo militia collapsed for a third time.
Stakeholders and background of the conflicts: beyond the Tigray region
Ethiopia’s internal strife is not confined to the Tigray region; tensions in Oromia, Amhara, and other areas, reveal the extent of a state in disarray. Oromia exemplifies these risks. Disputes over political exclusion, unequal resource distribution and land disputes have created an insurgency led by the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA).
Clashes between the OLA and government forces have advanced, disrupting livelihoods and stoking fear of further bloodshed. In 2023, the government relaunched its counterinsurgency campaign against the OLA after repeated peace talks failed, deepening cyclical violence.
Amhara, another critical region, has also been subjected to a deterioration in security. Historically aligned with the central government during the Tigray War, Amhara militias and regional forces have since turned against federal authorities. Tensions intensified in April 2023 when the government attempted to integrate regional security forces into the national military, causing more unrest. By August, heavy fighting in Amhara cities and towns had left hundreds dead and displaced thousands. In response, Ethiopia’s parliament declared a sweeping state of emergency, granting broad powers to detain individuals and restrict movement. However, these measures have failed to stabilise the region, instead leading to mass arrests and allegations of rights abuses.
Beyond these regions, the fallout from the Tigray conflict continues. While the November 2022 cessation of hostilities agreement ended active fighting in Tigray, human rights abuses continued. Eritrean forces, Amhara militias, and local authorities have been carrying out ethnic cleansing campaigns, particularly in Western Tigray. Reports of detentions, expulsions, and extrajudicial killings indicate ongoing insecurity. In addition, humanitarian aid has been severely impacted, with the World Food Programme (WFP) and USAID suspending food assistance due to widespread diversion schemes, leaving millions without access to life-dependent resources.
The wider humanitarian toll is profound. As of September 2023, there were 2.9 million internally displaced people in Ethiopia and over 141,000 Ethiopian refugees and asylum seekers in neighbouring countries. Civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and water systems, has been destroyed in the fighting, escalating already horrible living conditions. In Oromia and Amhara, targeted demolitions and attacks have also displaced populations.
Ethiopia’s internal volatility presents a multitude of risks for foreign businesses. Trade corridors critical to regional commerce are vulnerable, endangering supply chains and market access.
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a cornerstone of Ethiopia’s economic ambitions and regional energy strategy, risks becoming a focal point for broader tensions if disputes over its control intensify. Furthermore, the government’s far-reaching state of emergency measures have created an unpredictable environment, with growing reports of arrests, restrictions and property damage.
International actors, including the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN), have struggled to resolve the tensions. The federal government has resisted external scrutiny, rejecting UN investigations into human rights abuse and stalling transitional justice initiatives. Eritrean refugees, journalists, and civil society groups face increasing repression, highlighting a deteriorating human rights environment. In September 2023, international food assistance was partially resumed for refugees, but millions of food-insecure Ethiopians remain without aid, amplifying the risk of hunger-related deaths.
External actors: assistance and financing
Ethiopia’s regional conflicts are shaped not only by internal conditions but also by the involvement of external actors whose interest’s bear weight on the destination of these crisis. Neighbouring countries such as Eritrea and Sudan also play important roles, either through direct or covert support for various factions. Eritrea, for instance, provided military backing to Ethiopian federal forces during the Tigray War, a partnership that extended regional rivalries into local disputes. Eritrean troops were accused of atrocities in Tigray, including the mass killing in Axum. Sudan, meanwhile, is entangled in border disputes with Ethiopia, further complicating peace efforts.
Western powers, particularly the US and the EU, have also had considerable roles. The US, Ethiopia’s largest bilateral donor, provided over US$3 billion in humanitarian aid during the Tigray conflict.
However, relations have soured due to the Biden administration’s condemnation of atrocities committed during the war, including war crimes and crimes against humanity “by all parties”. The US imposed visa restrictions and suspended Ethiopia’s membership in the African Growth and Opportunities Act, while Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasised the need for accountability during his visit to Ethiopia in March 2023. The EU has similarly traded aid packages for notable progress reports regarding justice and reconciliation.
International organisations like the UN and AU have attempted to mediate peace and provide humanitarian assistance, but their efforts have been abated by limited access, insufficient resources and resistance from the Ethiopian government itself. The UN’s joint investigation with Ethiopia’s human rights commission found that all sides in the Tigray conflict – Ethiopian forces, Tigray forces and Eritrean military – committed violations amounting to war crimes. The AU brokered the 2022 peace agreement between the federal government and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which ended active fighting but clearly left many unresolved grievances.
Broader implications of international involvement
The participation of external powers reinforces the complexities of Ethiopia’s troubles. Eritrea’s military alliance with Ethiopia during the Tigray War showcased the depth of regional entanglements, while Sudan’s border tensions reflect how Ethiopia’s internal strife spills across its borders. For Western powers, Ethiopia’s strategic importance as a stabilising force in the Horn of Africa has been undermined by ongoing violence, mistrust and non-existent accountability.
Meanwhile, international organisations are finding it hard to balance diplomatic engagement with accountability measures. The AU, despite its successes in mediating the 2022 peace agreement, has faced challenges in ensuring its implementation, particularly as Eritrean forces and local militias continue to operate with impunity. NGOs operating in Ethiopia also face obstacles, from access restrictions to targeted attacks, further complicating relief efforts.
For multinational corporations, the risks of engaging in Ethiopia are plentiful. Trade corridors critical to regional commerce are vulnerable, jeopardising supply chains and market access. The intertwined economic and political risks demand vigilant monitoring for any business seeking to operate in or rely on Ethiopia.
Beneficiaries of the conflict
In regions such as Amhara, Oromia and Tigray, local political elites use unrest as an opportunity to consolidate power. They exploit ethnic grievances to rally support, politically marginalise opposition, and expand their influence over governance and resources.
Groups like the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and Amhara militias leverage instability to assert control over territories, enforce local rule, and demand political concessions from the federal government. Factions within the Ethiopian federal government may also use the crisis to justify emergency powers, suppress dissent and sideline political opponents under the guise of maintaining national security. Amhara Militias, also known as Fano, are groups that exploit unrest to push territorial claims, secure influence over disputed regions like Western Tigray, and access economic opportunities created by weakened state oversight. Officials in areas with limited federal presence use the unrest to strengthen their autonomy, often aligning with, or tolerating, armed groups for mutual benefit.
Opportunists also capitalise on the turmoil. Illicit Organised Crime Group (OCG) trade networks thrive in regions where state oversight is weak, profiting from the smuggling of agricultural commodities, such as sesame, and other resources. These actors not only sustain their operations but also worsen instability by funding armed groups.
Higher up the chain, geopolitical players like China and the US position themselves strategically to gain influence in the Horn of Africa. While China focuses on infrastructure investment and economic partnerships, the US pursues diplomatic influence through democracy and sanctions. Both powers, however, face criticism for pursuing their own agendas, as it is always at the expense of long-term stability in Ethiopia.
Conclusion
Diversifying supply chains is critical to mitigating risks from disrupted trade routes and unrest. Companies reliant on Ethiopian markets must assess alternative routes and suppliers to ensure operational continuity in the face of fluid barriers.
Looking ahead, Ethiopia’s future remains uncertain. While peace agreements, such as the 2022 Tigray accord, offer glimmers of hope, unresolved grievances and rising tensions in Oromia and Amhara suggest further conflict will continue. For businesses, staying informed and engaging with local and international stakeholders will be key to circumventing Ethiopia’s existing setbacks.
To download a copy of this article, please click here.
